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Posted on behalf of Dr. Dan Erikson in response to Dr. Lana Wylie:

Canada has a lot of advantages when dealing with Cuba as part of the Inter-American system. Canada has longstanding ties with Cuba and has avoided pursuing the U.S. strategy of isolation. Unlike the European Union, Canada is a unified national actor that can develop its foreign policy without getting bogged down in the mind-numbing compromises that are required when dealing with a sprawling multilateral bloc of 27 member countries. Unlike the nations of Latin America or Asian, Canada is a developed country and an important provider of development assistance. Thus Canada is in a unique position as a first world, non-EU nation that has positive ties to Cuba.

Unfortunately, Canada can be somewhat schizophrenic in its approach to Cuba, because it vacillates between two strong tendencies in Canadian foreign policy: the desire to curry favor with the U.S. versus the need to establish independence from Washington. Thus, Canada would never sanction Cuba, because that would bring it too close to the U.S., but it sometimes vocally criticizes the island for reasons that look like they had more to do with pleasing the US than with any specific events in Cuba. The strategy of the Harper government is even more confusing, because it often seems to be singing the tune of the Bush administration that American voters have long since sent packing. In the process, Canada is alienating Cuba at precisely the moment that most of the countries of the hemisphere are opening up to the island, and not doing much to help the Obama administration either..

Canada can play a constructive role in bringing Cuba into the Inter-American system, but it should act with greater clarity so it doesn't resemble a hockey player tripping over its own shoe laces.

Dan Erikson writes “Following the end of the cold war and the transition to democracy experienced by the rest of Latin America, the rationale for excluding Cuba shifted from geopolitical divisions to the establishment of democratic government as a de rigueur requirement for OAS membership.” I think this is an important point to consider. It seems that Cuba is plagued by shifting goalposts. The United States has also changed its rationale for its isolationist policy more than once. A few decades ago Washington was focused on Cuba’s involvement in Africa, earlier it was Cuba’s ties to the USSR. Since the end of the Cold War the United States has tied normalization of relations to Cuba’s human rights record. I wonder if the real reason for Cuba’s isolation is related to something Ramon Daubon alludes to in his piece: the Cuban devotion to establishing a truly sovereign nation.  

Hello Lana, I think you raise an excellent point.  I imagine it would be exceedingly frustrating for American officials to know that they are capable of having a massive influence on the international policy virtually anywhere in the world, but remain unable to influence a small island some 200 miles from their shores. 

Also, having so thoroughly stigmatized Cuba for the past half century, foreign leaders face significant political hurdles to normalizing relations with Cuba.  Particularly in the US, calling for conciliation with Cuba can be tantamount to political suicide (as indicated by Stephen Walt's fifth commandment for ambitions policy wonks).  Given Canada's history with Cuba, perhaps it could play a role in rebuilding Cuba's international reputation by serving as an intermediary between the Washington and Havana.  Thoughts?

Hi Michael, I think the frustration you mention plays a key role in American policy toward Cuba.  I agree also that the political hurdles hindering normalization in the US are large and I do think Canada might be able to play a role as an intermediary. However, I am not concerned about Cuba's international reputation as that is quite strong, especially in the region given the large amount of medical aid provided by Havana. I think the US is increasingly alone in its perceptions of Cuba.

Dr. Wylie, I agree with your position that Canada has a role to play in bring Cuba back into the fold. However, in practical terms, what type of steps should Ottawa be taking to achieve this goal (assuming the current Canadian government is interested in normalization)? What would be the most effective approach for Canada to take? For example, should Canada engage Havana with executive diplomacy in a very visible and public fashion or would low level interactions such as student exchanges, trade missions and working groups be the better option?

There are two more important challenges to consider regarding Cuba and the OAS. The first is that Cuba continues to severely restrict political and civil liberties . The second is that political divisions within the OAS complicate efforts to deal with Cuba.

When dealing with Havana I think it is on the whole better to avoid public discussions of sensitive issues.  What do you (and others) think?

I'm not sure we can simply dismiss Cuba as a "small island". This is a nation of 11 million people that has had a massive influence on the Americas in the past 50 years, and has proved to be the region's most enduring challenge to hemispheric democracy and multi-lateral governance.

And I would argue that the US has indeed had a profound influence on Cuba, much as it has in other countries where it tries in vain to sanction a pariah regime (look at North Korea, Iran, pre-2003 Iraq...). Continued American antagonism is one of the few remaining sources of legitimacy for the Castro regime, which it uses to justify human rights abuses against dissidents, as outlined in Ms Wylie's paper.

For me, America needs to shift the goal posts to a position of openness and trade. If Obama extended the open hand as he said he would in his inaugural address, increased flows of trade, aid and goodwill would go a long way to pushing Havana towards serious democratic reform. And with the US more open, Canada will no longer have to worry about pandering to Washington and can pursue Canadian-Cuban relations with the same intent that Trudeau had all those years ago...

Dear Lana,

Let me propose you a question. When US was no alone in its perceptions of Cuba?.

"When dealing with Havana I think it is on the whole better to avoid public discussions of sensitive issues.  What do you (and others) think?"

Given that our current Canadian government avoids public, or any,  disussion of foreign policy like the plague, I don't think keeping Cuba under wraps should be much of a problem for Ottawa.

I agree with Ms. Wylie that the US in increasingly alone, and even elements within the country are increasingly isolated in their continued persecution of Cuba. The problem is the US influence drags its allies in, leading otherwise rational countries like Canada and Colombia to modify their positions to please Washington.

"Given Canada's history with Cuba, perhaps it could play a role in rebuilding Cuba's international reputation by serving as an intermediary between the Washington and Havana.  Thoughts?"

Micheal: I think that Canada has been presented a major opportunity to be this type of intermediary. The history of 'schizofrenia' in Canada's approach to dealing with Cuba can in some ways be turned into a strength, as it provides the Canada with justifications for the persuasion of both sides of the discussion on Cuba as to Canada's neutrality and the lack of a consistant underlying biased motive.

I'm also of the opinion that the OAS is the perfect venue for Canada to act on its potential for such a intermediary role. Furthermore, pursuing such a course of action would, in the process, strengthen its ties and its status among the other leaders of the region. In many ways it is regrettable that the Canadian public, and even many of its leaders are not more aware of the country's opportunities and responsibilities for engagement with the Americas through the Organization of American States. The reason I bring this up is that I think more knowledge of the OAS among the Canadian public, Canadian students and civil society would lead to greater pressure to take advantage of the institution as a means to building and re-building a stronger reputation in the region, and possibly one as an effective mediator to resolve such issues as Cuba's exclusion. While Canada is one of the last countries to be admitted to the OAS, it is easily one of the strongest and most respected voices in the organization, and the Canadian public should know this and use it to its advantage in order to help steer the organization and the Hemisphere on a positive course, whether with regard to the topic of Cuba or any of the other pressing issues currently being faced.

 

Canada should clearly and publicly state its aims in respect to its relations with Cuba. 

While it is widely known that the current regime in Havanna suffers from obsolescence and continues to deny its citizens critical human rights, the similarly obsolete isolationist policy of the US does not seem to bear fruits as expected.  Due to its image as a "neutral" player, and a key economic partner and source of foreign exchange, Canada can openly demand Cuba to advance in democratic reforms.  The case has been made that the supposedly rabidly sovereign positions of Fidel's leadership were nurtured by US policy, but that in a less stressed environment his stance would become milder and more realistic. Even the current wave of "anti-imperialist" governments in the region (Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia) tend to manipulate public perceptions, and are fully aware that their lack of substance and economic mismanagement will eventually be addressed by their own citizens and the wider international community. Canada can support their efforts to advance as democracies, starting with Cuba. 

 

 

We should not overstate Cuba's influence on the Latin American region. The Castro brothers may still carry some influence on a limited group of acolytes, but neither the US nor Canada should over-emphasize the influence of a decaying autocracy, which is exactly what it wants to portray itself as a "defender" of the smaller nations from a supposeddly imperialist domination.

I tend to agree with everything that's been said on the prospects Cuba-Canada relations thus far, but I maintain that there is little appetite in Ottawa at the moment to navigate this foreign policy minefield, and to do so with clarity and a sense of purpose. Lana Wylie started her op-ed with an invocation of Prime Minster Trudeau's infamous visit to Havana - an enormous exercise in political risk. Until we see a majority government in Ottawa again, I don't see any administration, and especially Stephen Harper,  taking any domestic political risks for dubious returns in foreign policy. Obama, although fading in public opinion at home but still revered abroad, is a much more realistic figure to take up this fight.

This comment is posted on behalf of Dan Erikson:

To some degree the question of Cuba's inclusion in the OAS hinges on when and how conditionalities are applied. Does Cuba need to fully embrace democracy before it can join? Or is gradual progress in the right direction enough? Member countries should also think about which strategy is likely to yield more fruitful results, especially since exposing Cuba to the democratic norms of the OAS may arguably be beneficial in its own right.

Dr. Erikson raises an interesting point in the piece—and I wonder if perhaps Cuba might play am active role in the hemisphere through the ALBA? And then the question becomes—do you think ALBA will play an increasingly important role in the hemisphere and in turn, will ALBA have an impact on the OAS?

Bob,

I agree with the lack of effectiveness that sanctions can invoke when the umbrella of sanctions tend to be too broad and indiscriminate to most of the undeserving populations who usually do not have much of say on matters within the political realm.

The point you made on openness or transparency is what the international civil society in concert with joint political leadership in the Americas and abroad should focus on.

To seek as much common ground and directing our efforts towards those common interests would do much to change the course of relations. Much of history and the leaderships who shaped it have demonstrated that a linear path that is built on non transparent unilateral interests is just not feasible and will eventually fail or at least face fierce resistance. This non linear reality is the world of a bulging bureaucracy created in large part as a result of historically aggressive unilateral positions that political self interests have themselves created.

The 21 ^st century will require transparent governance that allows for a convergence of human thought unbiased by any historical predispositions. International civil society must take on the role of guiding humanity towards goals of this type. To promote unity in facing the challenges of our time must take center stage and focusing on goals that transcend borders and are of a great concern to all humanity are the perfect place to start with any international relationship including the relationship with Cuba and its place within the Americas.

When looking at advocating institutions that can take the lead in the pursuit of addressing humanities greatest challenges transparency must not waiver in the development or the administration of its charter.

To be partners in the pursuit of addressing goals that affect all humanity would help in setting the stage for continued collaborations that bring about consensus on the cultural divisions that also bring about much of the instability. Developing the 21 ^st century balance in this hemisphere and globally with transparent offers of inclusion and partnership is paramount.

In reply to Segundo Edilbetto Vergara Medrano:

 

The United States has always had a rather unique perception of Cuba but for some time during the Cold War the United States was able to persuade others in the hemisphere to go along with their policy of isolation. I think a few states shared at least some of Washington’s views of Cuba at that time, however, many states clearly agreed to support the United States because of American power. Among other things, Cuba’s active medical aid program has won them many friends in the region since then. The United States now has very little international support for its isolationist policy in Latin America, the Caribbean and elsewhere.

 

 

To address Dan Erikson's question on Cuba's inclusion in the Inter-American System: I think it makes more sense for the OAS to embrace a gradual approach to including Cuba. Similar to how the EU enacts a phased approach to membership, Cuba could be given a set of benchmarks for inclusion in the 'club' (as it was called yesterday) that could be agreed upon by both parties.

A couple points:  the question raised about ALBA is a very relevant one, because ALBA is one symptom of how the "Inter-American system" as it has been traditionally conceived is currently in flux.  In Washington we still like to think that the core of hemispheric relations runs through the OAS, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Summit of the Americas, but in fact there is an increasing level of competition from new actors.  These include ALBA led by Venezuela, UNASUR led by Brazil, newly created institutions like "the Bank of the South" intended to rival IMF and World Bank dominance, as well as a plethora of diverse regional organizations.  Increasingly, there is an Inter-American system that no longer runs through Washington but instead is firmly rooted in Latin America, and virtually all Latin American regional organizations welcome Cuban participation.  To some degree, the exclusion of Cuba from mainstream organizations like the OAS has actually hastened the rise of a parallel set of networks in Latin America.  Thus, the traditional Inter-American system may no longer contain sufficient incentives to encourage Cuba to embrace democratic reforms.

In addition, ALBA is already exercising itself as a concerted bloc in the OAS.  This means that Cuba currently is positioned in what Fidel Castro may consider to be the best of both worlds: excluded from the OAS (which Fidel despises) yet with sufficient allies in the OAS to have a profound impact on that institution's decision-making.

Lana Wylie's comments about Canadian engagement with Cuba, and their effects on rights and governance in Cuba, carried within them an interesting dichotomy of approaches. The Canadian approach is that of engagement, where one builds up diplomatic and trade connections in order to convince (or cajole) one's partner into democratic reform. The American approach, meanwhile, focuses on diplomatic and economic pressure to serve the same ends.

Wylie notes that both are failures, but it does raise the question of whether it was the combination that made both unsuccessful. Would the Canadian approach of engagement have worked absent American pressure? Would the American pressure have worked absent Canadian engagement? Or would neither have ever really achieved the end of provoking change? 

That raises another question. Wylie points out, rightly, that Canada is in an excellent place to take advantage of current Cuban change. it can take advantage of "political and economic opportunities" thanks to its long-term connections to Cuban "powerbrokers and average Cubans alike". I wonder if, in the end, this may not prove to be a vindication of the Canadian position after all. Even if engagement cannot force or provoke change, it may still be worthwhile, so as to allow countries like Canada to aid in any internally-generated process of change.

Naturally, it's still too early to tell. It does suggest, however, that the jury may still be out on engagement. It may not have been as unsuccessful as one might think.  

Craig has provided some really interesting thoughts on the engagement with Cuba. Particularly that the approach to dealing with Cuba will determine whether the international community will have any influence. Exclusion from the international community ironically seems to provide some legitimacy to governments that are perceived to be unjust.

 Mr Erikson has stated that "To some degree, the exclusion of Cuba from mainstream organizations like the OAS has actually hastened the rise of a parallel set of networks in Latin America ". Since the OAS is not well perceived in Cuba are other networks in Latin America not better position to inspire change in the region and in Cuba? Should we not support new actors that have a more localized understanding of the issues?

Regarding Branka's comment, the unresolved question regarding Latin America's outreach to Cuba is to what degree are countries seeking alternative approaches to consolidating hemispheric democracies, or is the effort to incorporate Cuba a backdoor approach to watering down democratic protections in the hemisphere?  One suspects that Venezuea, which often finds itself at odds with the OAS, would be comfortable with an OAS that is utterly toothless in protecting democracy.  The same may be true for Brazil, which still sees the OAS as a Washington institution and is more interested in increasing its own sphere of influence in Latin America.  U.S. promotion of democracy has its own problems, as it has often been pursued in a hamhanded and partial manner, and it remains a relatively recent development in a region that still remembers US actions to undermine left-leaning democratic governments during the Cold War.  Thus, the debate about whether or not to engage with Cuba illuiminates the sharp divisions that undermine any collective action to promote and defend democracy in the hemisphere.

Mr. Erikson:
Thank you for your response and insight. The issue you address of certain states involving Cuba to only decrease democratic protections in the region is highly problematic.

It seems to some extent that the OAS is facing questions of its legitimacy. Can more be done to portray the OAS as a regional actor rather than simply as a Washington based and influenced institution? What are some possibilities to transform this image? Would this transformation lead to more support in the region and perhaps even Cuban involvement?

 

Maybe what can happen is the Canadians can get closer and align themselves more to Cuba, then the U.S. align themselves more with Canada on the issue of Cuba...

Thanks to all of our panelists and participants who took part in the e-Conference discussion this week.

Our next session, Multidimensional Security: Haiti and a Common Strategy for the Future , runs from October 13-15. Watch this space for a full summary of session one and an extended preview of session two.

We hope to see you there!

The CIGI e-Conference Team