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Perhaps I will kick things off by raising a few questions.  Dr. Heine suggests that, "It may very well be that we want to extend the powers of the OAS and/or other Inter-American bodies to allow them to get involved in and prevent illegal or inconstitutional encroachments of the Executive into the powers of the Legislature or the Judiciary." Do you agree that the OAS needs more power to prevent future crises and what are the implications of such reforms? Also, given that these matters are largely based on qualitative distinctions - as Dr. Heine rightly points out - would you be comfortable in allowing the OAS to wield such interpretive power?  In sum, would the OAS have had the moral authority to prevent President Zelaya's referendum?

The OAS response to the the Honduran crisis has been appropriate, in the sense that the members are trying to find a peaceful resolution of the crisis using the diplomatic means available. The question would be, what will happen if these measures fail and the conflict estacalate, for instance if there is an attack to the Brazilian Embassy? Will the OAS advocate for economic or even military action?, what would be the consequences? How to control those countries that advocate for a violent resolution (o revolution) of the conflict?

This crisis is definetively a challenge for the OAS and for the region in general. However,  Honduras is just the immediate example, but the situation in Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela reflects that democracy in Latin America (if we ever had that, which is debatable) is in a process of transformation, and not for the best. I wonder whether political leaders and scholars are aware of that and whether they are taking the measures to advocate for a more sustainable democracy.   Reading the Latin American newspapers it seems that in many countries, democracy is a concept easily manageable.

 Michael, regarding your questions: In an ideal world, or course it would be great for the OAS to have more powers to prevent future crises. It would be great to have an international organization that protect latin American citizens from the abuses of its leaders. But I am not sure that Latin American countries would like OAS intervention against, for instance, the  referendums they develop to change the Constitution. They would argue violation to their sovereignty, etc, etc, etc.. Colombia is the most recent case... The country is ad portas of another referendum to change the Constitution for  the reelection of President Uribe for a third period, despite all the irregularities in the process.

Lionel Leblanc writes in via email:

Yes, the OAS' reaction was entirely inappropriate.  The OAS should be censuring the undemocratic, repressive practices of the Chavez dictatorship in Venezuela, not the legal, constitutional and assuredly temporary succession  taking place in Honduras.   The OAS has mistakenly labeled this change as a military coup, when in fact, it is a civilian interim government that has succeeded Zelaya, and this on the specific legal instrument of the Supreme Court having mandated an arrest warrant for Zelaya, for a number of undemocratic infractions of Honduran law.

Instead, the OAS and the U.S. are being bullied by the likes of Chavez, whose rigging of elections, ordering of assassination of legitimate peaceful protesters, whole scale repression of all instruments of civic and democratic society and free media, censorship of the media, threats to Colombia, collusion with the FARC and other dangerous narco-terrorists, constant imperialistic interventions across Latin America (not to mention environmental horrors perpetrated on a rich and bountiful land) and other crimes should have impelled the international community to sanction the current Venezuelan government.

Read Micheletti's letter to the Washington Post, September 21st.

I agree with Mr Leonel Leblanc that Honduras is just the tip of the iceberg. The OAS should be looking at the bigger picture and question what are the interests of some countries to escalate the conflict (or conflicts) in the region...

Developments over the week-end, in which the de facto government proclaimed a state of siege, suspended civil liberties and closed down Radio Globo and Channel 36 should give a clear indication on the state of democratic institutions in  Honduras. I am afraid the situation in the country is deteriorating steadily and the international community must realize it needs to speak with a unified voice, and not keep sending the sorts of mixed signals that can be interpreted as giving further leeway to the clamping down of freedom.

One of the challenges here is, as Michael suggests, determining how to interpret the "qualitative distinctions" among different violations of the democratic order in the region. The key phrase in the Inter-American Democratic Charter is the "unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order". The IADC doesn't clearly specify what this means, but others have. The best work on this has been done by UBC's Andean Democracy Research Network, often in close collaboration with the Carter Center. A core distinction is between interruptions to the democratic order such as military coups, versus alterations such as violations of the separation of powers, for example when presidents stack the courts or arbitrarily shut down parliaments. Putting meat on the IADC's bones is critical in order to give policymakers some clear guidelines to know when to take action. The point I tried to make in the interview (which I have also made before in a published article) is that things get complicated when we try to distinguish between "constitutional vs. unconstitutional". We cannot assume that constitutional is analogous to "democratic": some constitutions permit undemocratic actions.

On Lionel's point: while I agree that part of the problem here is precisely the confusion over what is and isn't constitutional, I would distance myself from arguments that point in a similar direction as Lionel's. (I am not sure if this is exactly what Lionel had in mind.) Some have argued that Zelaya had to be overthrown because he had become too influenced by Chávez. He may or may not have come under Chávez's influence, but this is not an appropriate rationale for overthrowing him.

Hi Maria, interesting questions. While I have little concrete evidence to support this claim, I see the likelihood of a forceful international intervention as remote; with the one exception of if the Brazilian embassy was to be attacked. However, as the next election draws near, the pressure to act will increase and, by association, so too will the risk of violence. That is why I think Oscar Arias' recent overtures towards presidential candidates is helpful in this regard. If he can convince the candidates to forgo an election for risk of not being recognized internationally, Mr. Micheletti loses a major card in his hand. Without the threat of an impending election, the OAS should have more time to pursue its diplomatic approach.

Thanks for the update Dr. Heine, these are certainly troubling developments.  How best could the international community make its voices heard? Would a UN resolution be the proper vehicle for this situation?

Jorge is right that the situation is very serious: not only for Honduras, but for the region as a whole. I would say that this only underscores the need to have a more pointed debate about the limits of non-democratic practices permitted in different countries' constitutions, so that this kind of problem doesn't occur in the future.

Dear Mr. Policzer, how do you see this situation in Honduras affecting other Central American countries, in the long run?

Hello Dr. Policzer, while I agree with you that "constitutional" yet undemocratic provisions within OAS member constitutions are problematic, I think it would be difficult to reach a consensus on what does and does not qualify as "democratic".  Also, enforcement of these standards would also be a major problem to overcome. Perhaps if the OAS had made membership conditional upon meeting certain democratic standards (similar to how the EU operates), each prospective member could have undertaken their own internal constitutional reform process. But I think OAS members might see it as an invasion of their sovereignty if this process was pushed now. I suppose my question would be, is there a way to approach constitutional reform without sounding sovereignty alarm bells? And does acknowledging flaws in the wording of the OAS charter undercut their ability to deal with Honduras?  I would be interested to hear your thoughts on this.

Andrea, to answer your question, let's compare the Honduran with the Guatemalan constitution. Article 272 of the Honduran constitution reads (I'll use the original Spanish; translations can be found on the net):

"ARTICULO 272.- Las Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras [...] Se constituyen para defender la integridad territorial y la soberanía de la República, mantener la paz, el orden público y el imperio de la Constitución, los principios de libre sufragio y la alternabilidad en el ejercicio de la Presidencia de la República."

I highlighted the key phrase to show that in Honduras the armed forces are constitutionally mandated to uphold the constitution. By contrast, in Guatemala, the armed forces are not given this power.

"ARTÍCULO 244.- Integración, organización y fines del Ejército. El Ejército de Guatemala, es una institución destinada a mantener la independencia, la soberanía y el honor de Guatemala, la integridad del territorio, la paz y la seguridad interior y exterior."

No mention of the constitution. In Guatemala it is the Constitutional Court which has this power:

"ARTÍCULO 268.- Función esencial de la Corte de Constitucionalidad. La Corte de Constitucionalidad es un tribunal permanente de jurisdicción privativa, cuya función esencial es la defensa del orden constitucional."

These differences are not insignificant. (And they are not unrelated to these countries' very different recent political histories.) The Honduran crisis has made it clear that what's written in different countries' constitutions matters. In the long run, we will have to take a much closer look at these sorts of differences. We cannot assume consensus over what is and isn't constitutional, especially when some constitutions (like the Honduran) permit such undemocratic practices.

Thank you very much Dr. Policzer!

Michael: The OAS already does make membership conditional upon meeting certain democratic standards. That's the point of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Some people have argued that dropping the ban on Cuba nullifies this, but that's not correct. Cuba has not (yet) been admitted to the OAS - it has been allowed to reapply for readmission. If it wants to be admitted (which it has said it doesn't) it will have to abide by the terms of the IADC.

I don't see a problem in the OAS stipulating constitutional standards, as it does democratic ones. If you think of this as a club, it's not a violation of sovereignty to stipulate standards for membership. It is a violation of sovereignty to impose them by force (as has been done in other parts of the world), but that option, thankfully, is not on the table in the region.

Thanks to the respondents thus far, especially Dr. Policzer with your constitutional analysis of the situation.

The one thing I'd like to ask is that, even if the Honduran constitutional permitted the army's action in theory, and if the OAS needs to adopt stricter constitutional guidelines as to who it lets in the 'club' - where does that leave us with the situation on the ground as it stands right now?

Dr. Heine pointed to the deteriorating situation on the ground, while others have raised the spectre of military action against either the Brazilian emabssy or the Micheletti regime. Against that backdrop, what can OAS and other regional actors do - right now - to strike a compromise that will defuse the situation?

Hello again Dr. Policzer, I appreciate the quick response and you are certainly right that the OAS already has democratic standards in place. I guess my question would be; is it too late to stipulate constitutional standards for existing members? Would existing members be required to adapt their constitutions or risk having their membership revoked? Bringing the discussion back to Honduras, do you think Honduras should be pressured to undertake constitutional reforms as part of its reinstatement; to prevent this sort of problem from reoccurring?

Just a skeptical voice... do constitutions really matter in Latin America?

"do constitutions really matter in Latin America?"

Given that the Honduran constitution has dominated the discussion thus far... I would have to say yes, they seem to!

A quick answer to María Lucía's question (I am still working on the others): Of course they matter! If they didn't, why have different countries spent so much time and effort to reform or completely replace their constitutions? In other parts of the world constitutions are fundamental documents. Why should they be any different in Latin America?

Bob and Michael, good questions. We're in a situation where the standards are not clear. One side points to parts of the constitution, the other to the IADC and to other parts of the constitution. There is no official final arbiter to rule on the dispute. In such situations, the resolution is likely to come either through negotiations or by force. If we assume neither side wants to use force - which I know may not be the case - the key to a successful negotiation is to ensure that each party understands at least the plausible validity of the other's position. This is not the same as agreeing to it, but it is different than completely disqualifying it. Also important to a successful negotiation is a neutral mediator, who can be trusted by both sides. Here I am not sure about the OAS's actions: on the one hand strongly condemning the coup, and on the other attempting to mediate. I hope I am wrong about this, and the mediation efforts succeed, but to me this seems to send contradictory signals.

How does Micheletti expect to have credible elections during a state of crisis.

(from the AP) "Zelaya supporters noted that the emergency decree effectively outlawed any campaigning until two weeks before election day. "If they can't campaign ... what happens then to the electoral solution?" asked protest leader Rafael Alegria?"

And no, changing the Honduran constitution should not be a requirement for the short term resolution of the conflict. This is more of a long term issue, to prevent such crises from recurring.

On the issue of the Interamerican Democratic Charter: The key point is that it allows for exactly the sort of action that the OAS took on 30 June. We can debate as to whether the document needs to be refined further to deal with impending threats to democratic institutions. But that is a discussion for another day. What we have today is a clear violation of the Constitution (soldiers taking a president at gunpoint from his home,  putting him on a plane and sending him abroad) of Honduras. The question is what will the Inter-American system do in reaction to that. I find  especially troubling the contrast between the unanimity exiting among Latin American governments about the need to put an end to the present situation as quickly as possible, and the mixed signals that are coming out of Washington, of which yesterday's pointed criticisms of President Zelaya by the U.S, Permanent Representative to the OAS are especially worrisome. The worst outcome of this whole situation at this point would be to reach the November 29 elections without having resolved the crisis, and to have a newly elected government that would not be recognized by anybody abroad, Every time those mixed signals are sent, the de facto government feels empowered to ban another international delegation from visiting or to clamp down even further on the opposition.

To Geoff: It seems that the state of siege enacted over the week-end will be lifted. That was apparently too much even for Micheletti's supporters in the Congress, who asked him to do so because the presidential elections would have no credibility whatsoever. But it is obviously a highly abnormal situation, and which drastic measures that are announced one day are revoked the next. It is difficult to see how any elections under such conditions can hope to have any legitimacy.

I agree that the state of siege undermines the Micheletti government's credibility, and that of the November elections.

The coup was certainly undemocratic, but I would say that what we have today is a dispute over whether this was or wasn't a violation of the Honduran Constitution. True, there is no "arrest in the middle of the night and send into exile" article in the Constitution. But when the armed forces are mandated to serve as guarantors of the constitutional order, this gives them a wide berth - too wide - to do exactly what they did.

Speaking of 'highly unusual' to use Dr. Heine's term, and in view of Dr. Policzer's call for effective mediation - how about Hugo Chavez? He knows the ins and outs of military coups, has the respect of Zelaya, and likely a good number of the protestors in Tegucigalpa too.

 Pablo-  you're right. The OAS' role as mediator in this conflict is truly undermined by their strong stand against Micheletti's government; however, I think this problem is rather difficult to overcome. So far,  I am unconvinced that any other body would have the wherewithall and clout to handle mediation efforts better. What do you think? Perhaps, as has been mentioned in this thread already, Oscar Arias' appeals to presidential candidates ought to be considered the best way to delegitimize the elections planned for November? Is the OAS crippled by its bias against Micheletti? It would seem that the expulsion of the OAS officials recently would show that Micheletti does not view the OAS as a neutral body.

So far, the UN Security Council has held back, and I'm not sure any more serious measures will materialize as long as the Brazillian embassy remains untouched. Perhaps if Micheletti makes good on his frequent ultimadums to Lula, things might change, but it is unclear how UN action might influence the elections, and long-term political stability for that matter.

My question is: Is it possible for the OAS as an institution to find its footing and succesfully pursue future mediation efforts as a "neutral" party? If so, should they?

Perhaps it would be useful to place what is taking place in Honduras in the wider international context of supporting democracy.

Looking at Asia,  Africa and Europe,  it should be clear that constitutional initiatives by Presidents have been common,   and are rarely seen as transgressions against democratic practice,   even when they are aimed directly or indirectly at extending the otherwise limited terms of sitting presidents.    There are often major battles over such initiatives,   usually pitting executive and legislative branches of government against each other.   But whether such initiatives succeed (as in Uganda) or fail (as in Malawi,)  these conflicts are seen as within "the rules of the game" -- while military interventions are not.

Surely we can recognize by now that every military intervention,   whether by the armed forces in Nigeria,   by the military in Pakistan,  or by soldiers in Honduras,  will be justified by an elaborate critique of the "undemocratic" character of the events "forcing" this step.    These post-hoc rationalizations do not change the nature of the transgressions that have taken place.

So for collective institutions throughout the world,  military-directed replacements of established executive regimes have come to justify condemnation and joint rejection.    The OAS seems very much part of this emerging tradition of collective action against military intervention in politics -- whether via the role of the Commonwealth in its moves against Pakistan,   or of ECOWAS in the Ivory Coast.

This collective action by the OAS seems to me to reflect this wide international commitment to promote and protect democratic institutions,  and I am surprised that there seems to be debate over the legitimacy of such a forthright response.   Certainly there are different ways that the particulars of the Honduras situation could be remedied.   But there should be no illusions about the need to follow OAS leadership and direction there.

Perhaps, Mr. Langdon, your last remarks were directed at me, but In no way were my comments aimed to attack the legitimacy of the OAS reponse. In fact, I believe they have responded admirably. My comments were regarding the contradictory role of the OAS seen thus far to act as both a neutral mediator, and defender of Zelaya (and what he stands for). I think that the two roles are difficult to play at once, and perhaps it would serve the OAS better to choose one (perhaps at the expense of the other). I don't think that the OAS is neutral, nor should they be. But my question was, who, if anyone, can fill the void?

In response to many of the comments today, and the material from our panelists, it seems that the OAS may lack the clout and consistency to arbiter the Honduran crisis. I agree with Ms. Beach as well as Mr. Heine that one cannot overtly support Zelaya, and broker a deal with Micheletti all at the same time.

I think what's needed now is someone to 'knock heads together', so to speak, and take leadership. This needs to be done by the great powers of the hemisphere. Brazil would have been my first choice, but has now compromised itself by abetting Zelaya. The United States has done well so far, and could well take the lead were it not distracted elsewhere. As Mr. Heine has even suggested, Canada may even have a very constructive role to play with its balanced reaction to the crisis.

Shantel:

Your comments reflect a quite common perception that the OAS should have behaved in a more neutral manner between the coup mongers and the previous government. The notion seems to be that a more balanced position would have enhanced the possibilities for success of any mediation efforts. Several things need to be noted here: the OAS is not an abstract entity; it reflects the will of the member states. The decision of the member states, taken unanimously two days after the coup, was to suspend Honduras from membership and to restore the situation ex ante as quickly as possible. That was the mandate of the OAS SG. You must understand how serious the situation was (and is), with the first military coup undertaken in LA in twenty years.

A second point to keep in mind is that some countries which carry a lot of clout have done precisely what you are saying--acting in a balanced manner between Zelaya and Micheletti. I am referring to the United States, of course. This "balanced"position has not allowed Washington to make any headway in solving the crisis either. To the contrary, it has only given further breathing room to the de facto government.

No,  Ms. Beach,  my remarks were aimed instead at locating the particulars of Honduras (on which people in this discussion have been concentrating,   in my view too narrowly)  into the broader international context of collective organizations taking action to defend democratic political space against intervention by the armed forces.   I also wonder if it is correct to say that the OAS is defending Zelaya and what he stands for?   It has seemed more to me that they have been defending the elected President of Honduras (who happens to be Zelaya) against an army attack on that institution.   If you are defending and promoting democracy,  as the OAS is,  you cannot be neutral -- though your mediation to re-establish what you consider a democratic context can consider various possible outcomes.   In that sense,  it seems to me the OAS can be both a defender of Zelaya (as the person who has been elected democratically to the Presidency) and a mediator.

What are the root causes that deflect continuous progress towards prosperity in the developing regions of the world?

 Would an aggressive stance promoting transparency in international business transactions help to clear up where governance and the business community collaborate in the interests of nation building or against it? What information is required by the international community to relate the failing of the global economic system with the collapse of governance institutions in the developing world?

 When influences project there special interests through the governing regime at the expense of the indigenous population by exclusion of fair and equitable commerce, can this be seen as mafia capitalism?

 Why is it necessary to have so many indifferent governance systems from within and from outside competing for the support of the population? Considering the size of these individual countries, would a union that supplants the current governance model be more beneficial for the whole of Latin America?

 Is it not clear that a uniform global initiative to correct the wrongs of history and promote global transformations for peaceful transitions to occur would be benificial?

 Would global initiatives such as the millennium development goals be more useful in situations such as the Honduras situation and others like it if we were to aggressively follow through with our pledges? Why is it that an accelerated response to these issues seems so illusive?

 Is the challenge of stable growth and opportunity for a prosperous an admired quality of life to daunting of a task? What is wrong with the assurance of a new bottom line for humanity?

 With the difficulty of a single nation trying to compete against an unknown level of ambiguous competition, would a constitution for humanity help level the playing field in providing the assurances that many take for granted in the developed world?

Bob:

I don't think it is right to say that Brazil has compromised itself by "abetting Zelaya". If that were the case, all countries in the Americas that voted to suspend Honduras from the OAS would be "compromised". There is no middle road between democracy and dictatorship. I think the OAS is the body tasked with carrying on the negotiations, but member states must step in as well and make efforts to push the negotiations in the right direction. The United States has had ample opportunity to do so, but has steadfastly refused to take a clear stand and exercise the sort of leadership many expected from the Obama adminsitration, which has been so vocal about its commitment to multilateralism (i.e., the OAS, in this case) and democracy in  Latin America. Nature abhors a void. Given Washington's reluctance to exercise this leadership, Brazil has stepped in, which is precisely what it should do. Over the past twenty years Latin American countries have become a lot more active in international affairs, while US influence, especially in the course of this decade, has declined quite dramatically. Intraregional political cooperation in the region has also increased quite a bit--Latin American leaders meet now all the time at the summit meetings of the myriad new entities that have emerged--from the Iberoamerican Summits to UNASUR. They have been able to solve some issues among them with these mechanisms (like the differences emerging between Ecuador and Colombia after the attack on the FARC by the Colombian Armed Forces in Ecuadorian territory last year, differences that were partially overcome at a meeting of the RIo Group in the DR a month later, and Bolivia's internal political squabbles,  successfully addressed in an UNASUR summit in Santiago in September 08). This may be the time for LA countries to address an even bigger challenge, like that of Honduras. The OAS provides the right vehicle for it, but it cannot do it by itself, and Brazil can help a lot.

Steve:

I fully agree with you on that. Unfortunately, as often happens in Latin America, issues get personalized, and thus we end up discussing the antics of Mr Zelaya and whether we like them or not, rather than the what is really at stake here, which is twenty years of democratization in Latin America. Honduras has put a question mark on it, and we should be focusing on that very serious challenge. Ironically, much of the debate on what has happened in Honduras since 28 June has not even about Honduras but about Venezuela and President Chavez. Those who take a strong stand against President Chavez (a Zelaya supporter) thus favor the de facto government, and those who favor Chavez, are against the coup. This, it seems to me, is exactly the wrong way to approach international affairs. This is not a beauty contest, but rather about the form of government we want to have in Latin America. We had succeeded in eradicating coups for twenty years, and suddenly they are back . This cannot be allowed to happen, no matter what sympathies we may or may not have for any given president.

It was never my intention in previous comments to advocate for a more neutral OAS approach, on the contrary I think that anything less than  the unanimous condemnation of the coup by OAS member states (as mentioned by Mr. Heine) would have been an outrage! My objective was to simply point out the hypocracy of pursuing a "neutral negotiator" role, when as Mr. Heine noted, member states held steadfast to a clear agenda.

Moving beyond this point, one could only hope that as Micheletti's weak claims to legitimacy continue to crumble, a neutral party might no longer be neccesary to broker the San Jose agreement. Micheletti and his men are losing their bargaining chip rapdily- not that they had much to begin with. Now, more than ever, the coup government is  in no position to demand a neutral party to mediate; which I think suits the OAS well.

Bob- I also think that there is a great opportunity for Canada to become more engaged here. Countries like Brazil and Costa Rica have acted outside of the confines of the OAS, and so too should Canada. There is a lot of room for creative solutions, especially given Canada's position within the OAS, having established the democracy promotion unit after becoming a full member in 1990.

In response to Steven and others' comments: there is a strong new (as compared to a generation or two ago) global norm in favour of democracy and against military coups. This is obviously a good thing. But norms work well when they are entrenched in strong institutions with clear standards. The problem here is that while the norm may be clear - we all agree that democracy is good and coups are not - the institutions are still developing (there is no official final arbiter for the dispute), and their standards are sometimes unclear or contradictory (e.g. what is and isn't constitutional). That is the central lesson of the Honduran crisis.

Given this situation, it is perfectly appropriate to point out the tension in the OAS's dual role as critic and mediator. True, the OAS has expressed the will of the Member States, and its actions are consistent with the terms of the IADC. But that does not lessen the tension.

The real question is how to balance the role of individual countries pushing for a solution and that of the OAS as the primary mediator.It seems to me that Brazil is finding a way to do that: holding fast to certain principles, while acknowledging that negotiations themselves have to be conducted by the OAS. The key challenge for the international community, and this is not only valid for LA countries, but also for everybody else, is to keep up the pressure on the de facto government, and make it clear that what is going on is not acceptable. The media also plays an important role: it is important to keep the Honduras issue alive, at a time when many other competing issues are holding the public's attention. The moment Honduras disappears from the news, inertia wins.

With such a great dialogue it is difficult to address so many interesting points in just one post.

The current Honduran political crisis is of clear importance for both the population of the Americas and for the governance system. It is also indicative of a broader problem in Latin America Presidential democracies–it is often difficult for other braches of government to hold elected executives accountable. Prior to the military’s removal of Zelaya (and we should not underestimate significance of the inter-American communities unanimous and rapid condemnation), there was a clear power struggle between the branches of government. This leads to the question that Dr. Policzer raised in his recorded interview when he questioned if the OAS ruling could be overlooking the legitimacy of the Honduran Supreme Court. In essence, are we dealing with incongruence between the rule of law and democracy?

In terms of a solution, to build on Dr. Heine’s pointcan there be both a multilateral solution—presumably through the OAS and have countries acting to bilaterally reach a solution(s) (ie not to say this would not work – but could it help to bolster a multi-lateral solution?)

Finally, I wonder why Zelaya ended up at the Brazilian embassy? And what impact does this have on Brazil’s role in hemispheric relations?

Lesley: Yes, there is a tension here between democracy and the rule of law. The OAS is urging respect for the constitution, but has essentially said that the Honduran Supreme Court - which is constitutionally the final arbiter in disputes between the executive and legislature, and which ruled against Zelaya - lacks legitimacy. You cannot urge respect for the constitution and then ignore a basic constitutional norm. Not all countries, even in Latin America, give the armed forces the power of guaranteeing the constitutional order. But the principle of the judiciary (via the Supreme Court or special Constitutional Tribunals) adjudicating disputes between executives and legislatures is fairly universal.

But,  Pablo,  isn't there a broader principle at work here?    If safeguarding and extending democracy is going to be done in the Americas,  there has to be an institutional enforcer,  a sort of referee,   that has the legitimacy and stature to intervene and articulate what is acceptable and what is not.   There was a time when the US took that role into its own hands,  and I am sure there is broad agreement that transcending that past is a huge advance.   This case does seem a crucial test for the OAS in taking on this role -- and the organization seems to me to have acted quickly,  decisively and with considerable consensus.   Surely supporting the OAS in doing this is a primary consideration that we should keep in mind?  

I would hope that Canada recognizes the importance of reinforcing the OAS -- and keeping attention on this issue. 

On the issue of the Honduran Supreme Court, which sided with the Honduras Parliament against President Zelaya: That is fine. We had a conflict between the three key state powers. The Honduras Constitution also gives certain powers to the Armed Forces which other Constitutions don't. That said, the notion that all of this background somehow makes what happened on 28 June less clear cut is to confound the issue. The idea that somehow the Armed Forces with the implicit or explicit support of Parliament and the Supreme Court have the right to take the president at gunpoint from his home and send him abroad on a plane is plainly wrong, and confuses two separate questions. One of them is the conflict that existed up to 28 June. The other is what took place on that day. To pretend that anything but a military coup took place then is to deprive the term of any meaning. To sya that the OAS would be interfering with the decisions of the Honduras Supreme Court is also absurd. The OAS reacted to the coup on 28 June. What happened before that day is a different matter. Conflicts between state powers happen all the time all over the world. The notion that because there is such a conflict the Armed Forces can step in and take out the elected president does not withstand scrutiny.

On Brazil, I mentioned earlier that this represents a great opportunity for Brazil to exercise the sort of leadership Latin America has been waiting for. Let us see whether Brasilia will make the most of it.

Steven: I agree with you on this. The Honduras crisis and its resolution brings together two elements that are very close to the heart of Canadian foreign policy. One of them is multilateralism (where support for the OAS comes in); the other is support for democracy. To belittle the role of the OAS in this issue and to somehow minimize the significance of the 28 June coup is thus to inflict a double blow to two key, traditional principles of Canadian foreign policy.

Dr. Heine importantly highlights the possible role of Brazil. However Lula is facing criticism in Brazil over the role Brazil is perceived to be playing in Honduras. Some in Brazil think that Brazil is becoming too involved. Will this perhaps have an impact on its continued role in the current situation? Moreover will the other countries be hesitant to get involved if there is a lack of domestic support?

Also Dr. Heine insightfully argues that Honduran issue needs to be "kept alive" in the media. Is the lack of international support due to the lack of media attention on the actual situation in Honduras? What can be done to keep the issue of Honduras in focus? 

Branka:

There will always be domestic criticism at home for whatever governments do abroad. President Lula's approval ratings are at 80%, and he cannot stand for reelection in 2010, so he can do pretty much what he wants on Honduras. My impression is that he is taking it seriously enough to push through for a solution. A key factor here is to make clear that, unless there is a change in the current situation, the 29 November elections will have no legitimacy whatsoever.

To keep the Honduras issue in focus, you must do what you are doing now, that is , participating in discussions about it, sending letters to the editor, making your voice felt. A big problem is Canada is the lack of interest by the media in Latin America, which is partly fueled by the editors' view that readers and viewers are not interested in Latin America. Yet, that does not seem to me to be the case. Many of my students are much more interested in traveling in and spending time in Latin America (and especially in Central America) than in, say, Europe.

Dr. Heine:

Thank you for the information on Brazil and President Lula's position. Lula's being critized for involvement in Honduras was a headline in some newspaper and again points to the lack of focus on the situation in Honduras.                                                        Also, I completely agree that there is a lack of media interest in Canada about the current events in Latin America. This is certainly an issue that needs to be addressed sooner rather than later.

Furthermore, Shantel has stated that there is "room for creative solutions" . Are creative solutions possible ? What are some possibilities?

Can the November 29th elections legitimacy be helped? Are there possibilities of sending monitors? Perhaps even Canadian ones?

Steven: There is no institutional enforcer in this case. This a basic principle of international law, which unlike domestic law exists in the absence of such an enforcer - a global state. So we are left with other sorts of alternatives: the carrots and sticks of diplomatic and other pressures, negotiations, good will, etc.

And Jorge: I don't dispute that this was a coup. It was. The debate is over whether it was constitutional. As I explained above, the armed forces' actions on June 28 were at least plausibly constitutional. They may have gone beyond the letter of the Supreme Court ruling (which did not call for arrest and exile), but as guarantors of the constitution the armed forces have power as a "final arbiter" which in some ways goes beyond that of the SC. That's why these constitutional stipulations are so pernicious, and why other countries - such as Chile - have removed them.

I would like to comment first  on the role of the OAS. The OAS as founded at the instigation of the USA, it's primary focus was/is to0 ensure the dominance of the USA, in the American sphere and prevent  powers other then the USA from gaining undue influence in the Americas. In the background id the American fear that comunism becomes a major political force that couls destroy the American way of life. Thus when a political leader  proclaims to be "communist", he government of the USA sees danger..

While the government o the USA can not invade or openly support a regime with a different philosophy,  they will support a loc al subservant administration. Not only will the support be morally but also include money and weaponry.

In general, People of the ruling class in Honduras are afraid  that a "comunistt" regime could confiscate their property as well as that of the large Amertican agribusiness, and the contract suppliers to large retailers. With the support promised it will be easy to organize a revolutioniary force and overthrow the government. (In the end a new government will be installed which willo be "anti communist", which willm follow the "old "conomic order much to the satisfaction of the US government

The situation reminds of Guatemala, where similar events unfolded

Branka:

Of course there is room for creative solutions, and it is important to get the parties back from the brink, as it were. But for that to occur, it is important to set the conditions for it to happen. Tow things are critical in that regard: First, to restore the situation ex-ante, meaning restoring President Zelaya to office and allow him to finish his term. The second, is to be clear that if that does not happen quickly, the 29 November elections will be a futile exercise. A key step is to make clear to the various presidential candidates in Honduras today that unless they pressure the government to change things, whoever wins in November (and the rest as well) will not only have a victory not worth having, but will be marked forever for having participated in such sham elections.

The legitimacy of the 29 November elections will be determined in the next few days and weeks by the decisions taken by the de facto government. If current conditions do not change ( they already closed a radio station and a TV channel and destroyed the equipment, which will take some time to replace), there is no way they will be legitimate. Therefore, we should not get ahead of ourselves and start thinking about monitors and the like. If the proper conditions for an elections campaign are not there (including access to the media, which has now been suppressed), no legitimate elections can take place, no matter how many international monitors are deployed.

Pablo: the notion of constitutional coup seems to me a bit of an oxymoron. Either you have a coup or you don't. You might have an unresolved constitutional difference between various state powers; but if you resolve that difference by sending in soldiers to kick the president out of the country you have a coup.

Just a final thought -- I do most of my work in the context of Africa,  and it is striking to see the difference in the framework of reference used in analysis of relationships in the two areas.  Pablo's notion that there is no "referee" in the Americas,  or Jo Ann's view of the OAS as (now) a creature of the US,  are remarkably foreign in considering the evolution of the African context.   In Africa,   the African Union is seen as an increasingly significant (and certainly independent) cross-continent force,   able to take military action (as in Darfur at the moment,)  with a system of ongoing peer-review of internal state governance systems (the APRM -- African Peer Review Mechanism) that produces critical and detailed public reports evaluating the democratic and human rights context in individual nations,   and with an elected parliament that enforces accountability on AU leaders.   Even more effective are sub-regional bodies like SADCC (for Southern Africa)  and ECOWAS (for West Africa) that set norms of democratic behavior and have developing systems to enforce them.   There are still weaknesses in African enforcement mechanisms,  and capacity does not meet ambitions within institutions,  but there is clearly a web of cross-country structures with considerable legitimacy that influences and constrains individual nation states.

It is unclear to me why some do not see the OAS in the same light in the Americas.

Dr. Heine:

I appreciate your quick response and quite insightful statements. One issue seems to be whether restoring President Zelaya to office will lead to violence and turmoil.

Steven:

Questions of OAS legitimacy and the power relations at work within the organization are to be found in relation to many international organizations. This does not mean that these questions should be disregarded but rather that they should be addressed through t ransparency  and continued assessments of the institutions e ffectiveness .

While it seems to be regarded with skepticism it does have its supporters.Peter Hakim states that "Its success in reversing the Honduran coup is not a fair test of the importance or efficacy of the OAS."

A final thought, posted on behalf of Pablo Policzer:

Jorge: A constitutional coup is not an oxymoron at all. The classic example is Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, which reads (in part):

“If public security and order are seriously disturbed or endangered within the Reich, the President of the Reich may take measures necessary for their restoration, intervening if need be with the assistance of the armed forces. For this purpose he may suspend, in whole or in part, the fundamental rights provided in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153.”

In other words, this gives the President pretty much unlimited powers in times of crisis. The day after the Reichstag fire, Hitler used Article 48 to consolidate the Nazi regime’s power. That was a constitutional coup. The powers given to the armed forces in many Latin American constitutions – including Honduras – are of a similar type. As guarantors of the constitutional order they are given the power to overthrow otherwise constitutionally and democratically elected governments, as the Honduran armed forces did in June. Carl Schmitt famously argued that “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” We need to do a better job of looking at the many often highly undemocratic exceptions allowed in Latin American constitutions, instead of assuming that “constitutional” is a straightforward complement to “democratic”.

Thanks to all of our panelists and participants who started off the e-Conference with this productive and wide-ranging discussion. Tomorrow's topic - Inter-American Mechanisms for Promoting Democracy - is closely related to our discussion today and features the following contributors:

• Andrew F. Cooper, Associate Director and Distinguished Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation
• Dario Soto, Deputy Director, The Trust for the Americas
• Dr. Pablo Gutierrez, Director, Department for Electoral Cooperation and Observation, OAS

We hope to see you there!

The CIGI e-Conference Team